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The Medical Malpractice Imbroglio: A
Non-Adversarial Suggestion
By ELLIOTT M.

I.

TH

ABRAMSON*

CURRENT SYSTEM

The current tort system, as applied to medical malpractice, has
two goals: a) to guarantee fair compensation to persons injured
through the negligence of medical care providers; and b) to deter
poor practice by imposing liability on parties who engage in negligent medical care.' The fair compensation goal focuses on compensating victims for the losses they suffer as a result of the
negligent party's conduct. 2 This reflects the so-called "positive
side" of tort law. 3 On the other hand, the deterrence goal focuses
on discouraging and stigmatizing the provider's substandard medical care. 4 This embodies the so-called "negative side" of tort law.'
In fact, the current system has failed to achieve either of these
goals due to the complexity and nature of medical malpractice
litigation. 6 This failure is evidenced by inconsistent awards7 resulting in undercompensation of victims in some cases8 and overcompensation in others, 9 higher medical costs due to defensive medicine 0

* Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A., Columbia University, 1960; J.D.,
Harvard Law School, 1963.
1 Tancredi, Designing a No-Fault Alternative, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277, 27778 (1976).
2 Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CAtin. L. REv. 665, 666

(1985).
3 Id. at 667.
IId. at 669. The deterrence goal may be accomplished through direct deterrence,
which forces the provider to pay damages, or indirect deterrence, which focuses on loss of
market share. Indirect deterrence results in loss of market share by requiring the provider
to pay damages, causing higher prices and, thus, loss of market share.
Id. at 667.
See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 13-21 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 3040 and accompanying text.
,o See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
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and higher administrative

Costs. 12

One of the most vexing problems of the current system is the

inconsistent, arbitrary awards that juries accord injured patients.
Jury awards are affected by the ability of the opposing lawyers,

3
the nature of the injury, and the whim of the particular jury.
Because juries often base their verdicts on emotion or sympathy

for the victim, 14 they seem to award more for injuries that they

can actually see.'- Thus, similarly situated victims receive widely
disparate awards.16 For example, a federal judge in Texas simultaneously tried several asbestos cases before separate juries. 7 Although the juries heard the same evidence, they granted widely
varying awards.' 8
In addition to the jury process, geographical bias also causes

inconsistent awards. A study by Professor Danzon found that
"[u]rbanization is the single most powerful predictor of both frequency and severity" of claims.' 9 The result is that courts located
in urban areas grant higher awards than those located in rural
areas. Furthermore, these geographical differences are manifested
in awards that vary among the states. 20 Thus, the amount of
compensation that victims receive could depend on where they live.

Due to the inconsistencies in the current system, doctors are
sometimes held liable where a patient's injuries are attributable to

preexisting conditions rather than to negligence, while in some cases
of actual negligence, no liability arises. In short, tort liability for
medical malpractice resembles a lottery2' rather than a reliable
remedy and a deterrent to negligent medical practice.
" See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
11Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALiF. L. REv. 555, 594 (1985). See

also R.

KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BAsIc PROTECTION FOR TnE TRAmc VICTcm 22-24, 29-30,
225 (1965).
'4 O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract In Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees
of Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALiF. L. REv. 898 (1985) "Jurors will award
substantially less for a seriously injured back or other injury they cannot see, than for a
more visually striking injury such as extensive scarring." Id. at 900.
15 Id.
16

Sugarman, supra note 13, at 594.
Taking Advantage of the Tort Crisis, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 329, 336 n.40

17 Sugarman,

(1987).
"Id.
" Sugarman, supra note 13, at 594 (quoting Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of
Medical Malpractice Claims, 27 J.L. EcoN. 115, 143 (1984)).
2 Id.
1I O'Connell, Neo No-Fault Remedies for Medical Injuries: Coordinated Statutory
and ContractualAlternatives, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125, 127 (Spring 1986).
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As a result of the current system, many injured patients are
undercompensated or go entirely without compensation for their
injuries, while others win awards far in excess of the damage caused
by their actual injuries. Some victims are undercompensated for
their injuries due to the complexity of medical malpractice litigation. Personal injury cases arising from medical malpractice are
among the most difficult to litigate because both medicine and the
human body are extremely complex? 2 Juries frequently cannot
understand the technical, confusing, and often conflicting testimony of medical experts,23 or the distinctions between injuries
attributable to a physician's negligence and injuries that fall within
normal statistical probabilities of occurrence3 4 In addition, it may
be difficult to find another doctor to testify against the defendant
25
because of the so-called "conspiracy of silence".
Victims are also undercompensated because of the high transaction costs involved in complex litigation. Indeed, after accounting
for the time, effort, and cost of litigation, the victim usually
receives less than fifty percent of the verdict award.2 6 This hardly
makes victims "whole" again; in fact it doesn't even make them
"half".
Even more devastating than cases of undercompensation, perhaps, are cases that are not even litigated. Here, injured victims
get no compensation. Because many lawyers accept only large
claims (in hopes of "hitting it big"), 27 injured patients with rela2
tively small claims are entirely uncompensated for their injuries.
Additionally, many victims never file an initial claim because of
29
loyalty to their physician or ignorance of the tort litigation system.
n J. O'CONNELL,

AND SERviCES

ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS

29 (1975).

O'Connell, supra note 21, at 125.
- B. KEENE, A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE, CALIFORNIA'S MEDICAL MALPRACTICE Csis 29 (1976).
2 The medical profession resents malpractice lawsuits and, as a result, it is extremely
difficult to find physicians to serve as expert witnesses on behalf of plaintiffs. See O'Connell,
Expanding No-Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals,59 VA. L. REa. 749 (1973)
"In one particularly grim example, research conducted by the Boston University Law
Medicine Institute indicated that 70 percent of doctors polled would refuse to testify on
behalf of a patient in a suit against a surgeon who had mistakenly removed the wrong
kidney, despite the clear merit of the claim." Id. at 756. See also J. O'CoNNELL, supra
note 22, at 30.
6 M. SCHWARZ, MEDICAL MALPRACTIcE-TORT REFORM, LILrY CRISIS: THE PHY21

SICIANS' VIEWPOINT

18 (1987).

O'Connell, supra note 25, at 756.
28Id.
Comment, The Medical Malpractice Crisis: Will No-Fault Cure The Disease?, 9 U.
HAw. L. REv. 241, 243 (1987).
27
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Paradoxically, many victims are overcompensated for their injuries. First, many injured patients receive extravagant pain and
suffering awards. Because of the difficulties in placing a monetary
amount on noneconomic injuries and the complexity of modern
medical practice, juries often grant enormous verdicts to injured
patients based on sympathy toward the victims.3 0 Lawyers in subsequent cases base their claim for damages on the latest "bench3
mark" award, thus spiraling the size of claims upward. 1
These extravagant pain and suffering awards have resulted in
a dramatic increase in the size of recoveries. The average size of a
medical malpractice verdict increased 363% from 1975 to 1985.32
Specifically, the average verdict rose from $220,018 in 1975 to
$1,017,716 in 1985. 33 Do injured patients today incur more "pain
and suffering" than injured patients in 1975?
A recent Rand study of jury cases in Cook County, Illinois
concluded that jury awards vary widely among victims with the
same injury.3 4 In fact, the average victim of medical malpractice
received five times the amount of an injury-on-property plaintiff
and almost two times the amount of a victim injured at work or
by a defective product. 35 The victims of medical malpractice, however, are presumably no more deserving than the victims of auto36
mobile accidents, defective products, or work-related injuries.
Moreover, other disabled people (including individuals who are
genetically disabled, sick, elderly, veterans, or unemployed) have
the same "need" for compensation as victims of medical malpractice, yet the programs that pay for their disabilities do not compensate for pain and suffering. 37 Thus, the large awards granted
to medical malpractice victims seem disjunctive with the amounts
given to other victims of injuries and disabilities.
Second, some medical malpractice plaintiffs are overcompensated because the high cost of litigation often induces providers to
settle even unmeritorious claims. Because they find it cheaper to
pay the claim than to litigate it, health care providers often don't

O'Connell, supra note 21, at 125.
11Winter, Medical Malpractice: Will Jumbo A wards Spark Another Insurance Crisis?,
31

68 A.B.A. J. 1545, 1547 (1982).
32 M. ScHwAz, supra note 26, at 18.
33 Id.
' Id. (citing Chin & Peterson, Deep Pockets, Empty Pockets, RAND CORP. INST. Civ.
JusT. 54 (1985)).
" Id.
36 Sugarman, supra note 13, at 595.
37 Id.
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resist small, nuisance-type claims. 8 Thus, some plaintiffs with unmerited or frivolous claims receive a higher award than they deserve.
Finally, some injured patients are compensated twice: in tort
and by their health insurance.3 9 Eighty-five percent of Americans
have some type of insurance from a collateral source (i.e., group
or individual health insurance, Medicare, Medicaid). 4° Those who
do not are usually quite poor. Under the current tort system,
allowing those covered by insurance to also sue in tort results in a
double recovery.
In 1986, an American Medical Association ("AMA") survey
found that seventy-eight percent of physicians thought they practiced "defensive medicine". 4 1 Thus, they not only diagnose and
treat patients on the basis of medical necessity, 42 but also with an
eye toward avoiding legal liability. For example, assume a patient
complains of a headache. 43 This is an illness, like most others, that
requires the physician to exercise medical judgment in prescribing
a treatment. The patient is most likely (ninety-eight percent probability) suffering from a migraine or tension headache; however,
44
the patient has a two percent chance of having a brain tumor.
The physician should use his or her judgment to determine if a
CAT scan 45 should be performed. The CAT scan can detect the
brain tumor, but it is costly and has a five percent chance of
causing an adverse reaction. The threat of a malpractice suit may
nudge the physician toward performing the test on everyone with
a headache. Given the great number of patients with headaches,
such a practice would be very costly. 46 In fact, the cost of defensive
medicine has been estimated at $15.1 billion, or four percent of
health expenditures. 47

WILLARD, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-TORT REFORM, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRIsis AND THE NEED FOR TORT REFORM 6 (1987).

19.
O'Connell, supra note 21, at 125-26.
10 Sugarman, supra note 13, at 647.
41 M. ScIrwARz, supra note 26, at 20 (citing L. HARVEY & S. SHUBAT, A.M.A.
SURVEYS OF PHYSICIAN AND PUBLIC OPINION (1986)).
42 Id.
4'This example was developed in Comment, supra note 29, at 246,
"Id. (citing R. RAKEL, CONN'S CURRENT THERAPY 732 (1985)).
, "CAT stands for computerized axial toxography, ant advanced technique which
reconstructs a three-dimensional view of the body's organs." Comment, supra note 29, at
245 n.33.
4 Id.
41 Id.
at 242 (citing A.M.A., REPORT No. I PROFESSIONAL LIArILIY IN THE 80's 16
(1984)).
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This raises another major problem of the current system: the
enormous price physicians must pay for malpractice insurance. The
total premiums paid by physicians doubled in two years: from $1.7

billion in 1983 to $3.4 billion in 1985. 4 The average premium for
all physicians in 1985 was $10,500 per year. 49 This figure is much
higher (up to $92,000 per year) for high risk specialties such as

neurosurgery and obstetrics.50 It is, therefore, not surprising that
many physicians have abandoned these expensive specialties 5' and
some insurance companies have stopped providing coverage to such
specialists. 5 2 Physicians who continue to practice must pass these
higher costs on to their patients. The result is that society bears
the burden of the current medical malpractice system through
53
higher medical costs and a reduced number of physicians.

The current system also carries high administrative costs. Since
proving medical malpractice is very difficult, litigation requires

great amounts of time and research into causal factors.5 4 This
results in substantial costs to the patient and the health care provider, and an increased burden on court dockets. 5 Administrative
costs are also increased because the current system encourages
injured patients to prolong their disabilities.5 6 The collateral source

rule permits a double recovery for injured patients by allowing
them to recover damages for medical expenses already reimbursed
through insurance.17 Thus, injured patients can raise the amounts

they can recover by simply incurring more medical expenses.58

Furthermore, injured patients are also encouraged to run up their

41

WsuLAw, supra note 38, at 4.

49 Id.
50

Id.

S1

Comment, supra note 29, at 242.

52

Id.

11Id. at 243.
14 B. KEENE, supra note 24, at 29.
11 Medical malpractice cases are among the most difficult to litigate. They usually
take two or three times longer than other personal injury cases because of the complexity
of the requisite expert medical testimony. Thus, although few in total number, they contribute significantly to the congestion and overload of the court system. U.S. Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, Report of the Secretary's Commission on Malpractice
18 (1973). See also J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 22, at 30.
m O'Connell, supra note 14, at 900.
51Id.; see, e.g., Nation v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981) "Under
the collateral source rule, benefits received by an injured party from a source wholly
independent of the wrongdoer should not be deducted from the damages that the wrongdoer
otherwise is compelled to pay the injured party." id. at 699.
11 O'Connell, supra note 14, at 900.

91MEDICAL
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medical expenses because juries generally grant higher pain and
suffering amounts to victims with higher economic losses 9
The disincentive for insurance companies, plaintiffs' attorneys,
and patients to settle out of court further burdens the court system
and increases administrative costs. An insurance company is diversified and, therefore, can bear the risk of losing the case better
than the individual victim 0 Because an insurance company earns
interest by holding on to its money while the victim might become
desperate enough to settle for a modest amount, the company
benefits from the delays of litigation. 61 Plaintiffs' lawyers are also
diversified, as they have many cases among which to spread their
risk of loss. 62 Rather than settle out of court for the patients'
economic losses, the lawyer may bring all cases to trial in the hope
that one case will "hit it big" . 63 While the lawyer may indeed
strike gold by winning one of those cases, he or she might forego
a reasonable settlement for other clients 4
The injured patient might also discourage early settlement. If
the patient's medical expenses are already being reimbursed by
insurance, the patient might be willing to take a chance at a sizable
verdict. Since most offers to settle out of court will be below the
actual economic lOSS, 65 an early offer equal to the economic loss
might be seen by the plaintiff as a sign of weakness on the part
of the health care provider." This might encourage the plaintiff
not to settle in hopes of receiving more through litigation.67 Some
plaintiffs, however, may be forced to accept this low settlement
68
because of desperation, urgent financial need, or lack of proof.
Beyond these quantitative problems, many qualitative problems
also corrode the current system. Injured patients who are entitled
to a recovery might not receive their awards until many years have
passed. 69 The doctor/patient relationship is contaminated 70 because
59 Id.
60

Id. at 901.

61 Id.
6

Id. at 902.
at 903.

63 Id.

"Id.
63 Id. at 902.
6 Id.
67

Id.

Sugarman, supra note 13, at 594.
- See O'Connell, supra note 14, at 914 (for example, a teenager in Seattle, Washington, who was paralyzed by a football injury, waited over seven years to obtain a jury
verdict).
6

70

M.

SciwAgz,

supra note 26, at 21.
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doctors, who feel that their role is to support and aid their patients,
are uncomfortable in the paradoxical role of potential adversary.
The trust and confidence between doctor and patient, which is
critical to proper health care, is therefore poisoned. 71 Moreover, in
many cases, providers and employing institutions such as hospitals
are also pitted against one another as each tries to defend against
charges of malpractice by shifting responsibility to the other. 72
Some physicians incur great emotional distress and injuries defending malpractice suits, leading to losses of time, confidence, and
morale. 73 Physicians may also be reluctant to use new procedures
and to treat high risk patients because of the fear of liability. 74
The malpractice crisis has generated a cumulative effect of
jeopardizing necessary medical services, increasing costs, and *creating mistrust and poor morale on the part of both doctor and
patient. Yet, notwithstanding this cost, the twin goals of the tort
system (compensation and deterrence) are not achieved because of
the poor correlation between injury and liability. However, merely
complaining about the evils of the current system serves no purpose
unless an alternate system of compensation and deterrence exists.
The most promising such alternative seems to lie in a more nonadversarial, no-fault approach.

II.

HISTORY OF NO-FAULT REMEDIES FOR INJURY

The earliest no-fault remedy for injury was embodied in workers' compensation laws in late nineteenth century Germany. 75 Similar laws were adopted in the United States shortly after the turn
of the century. 76 Prior to the enactment of these laws, workers and
employers faced many problems similar to those facing patients
and doctors today: high costs of pursuing claims in tort, the
potential bar of contributory negligence, development of ill will
between parties where cooperation is desirable, if not necessary,
and many uncompensated losses. 77 After workers' compensation

71 Moore & O'Connell, Foreclosing Medical Malpractice Claims By Prompt Tender
of Economic Loss, 44 LA. L. REv. 1267, 1269 (1984).
72

Id.

supra note 21, at 126 n.4.
M. ScrawARz, supra note 26, at 21.
1,O'Connell, supra note 21, at 128.
71 O'Connell,

74
76

Id.

- Id.
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laws were enacted, workers were compensated more quickly, con78
sistently, and uniformly for economic losses.
Recently, no-fault automobile insurance has replaced tort claims
with regard to automobile accidents in the United States. Because
each party's insurance company pays its client's economic loss
regardless of fault, the large transaction costs associated with the
adversarial system have been eliminated. Again, it has resulted in
quicker, more reliable compensation to plaintiffs at a lower cost
than was possible under tort litigation. 79 Moreover, there is no
evidence that the absence of tort liability has increased occurrences
of reckless driving.80
A no-fault remedy was first adopted in the medical area with
the advent of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 198681
("Vaccine Act"). An increase in tort litigation involving vaccinerelated injuries was causing vaccine manufacturers to withdraw
from the market 82 and many injured children were not receiving
compensation for their vaccine-related injuries. 83 Congress took
action to avoid the possibility of a national health care problem
by enacting the Vaccine Act.84
Under this legislation, a claimant must first file a claim with
the U.S. District Court.85 A master 6 obtains evidence and conducts
hearings to determine whether the child's injuries were in fact
caused by the vaccine. 87 The master's findings are then forwarded
to the district court for a formal ruling. 88 If an award is granted,
it is generally confined to economic losses and limited pain and
suffering damages. 89 The claimant then has the option of accepting
the judgment or suing the manufacturer in tortP0 Funding to pay

78

Id.

79Id.
soId.

1 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-1 (West Supp. 1989).
t2 Schwartz & Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An Ad
Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 387, 388-89 (1987).
3Id.
s4

Id.

87

Id. at 390.

The district court designates "a special master to assist in obtaining evidence,
information, and testimony, and to conduct hearings and prepare proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law and submit these findings to the district court." Schwartz &
Mahshigian, supra note 82, at 390.
" Id.
u Id.
Id. at 390-91.
0 Id. at 392-93.
"
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damages awarded under the Vaccine Act comes from a trust fund
financed by an excise tax on the sale of the vaccines covered by
the Act. 91

In 1987, Virginia adopted legislation under which infants who
incur severe neurological injuries during the birth process may be
compensated. 92 Florida passed a similar statute, which took effect
in 1988. 93 Both statutes provide automatic scheduled compensation
for the injured infants without regard to the physician's fault.

Under the mechanics of these statutes, the claimant files a
petition with a commission, which also hears workers' compensation claims. 94 A medical advisory board, comprised of physicians,
then evaluates the claim's merits9 5 and files a response within thirty
days. 96 The commission then must hold a hearing within 120 days
97
after the claimant files the petition.
The commission determines whether the injury is a birth-related
neurological injury. 98 A rebuttable presumption arises that the in-

jury is a birth-related neurological injury if the infant sustained a
brain or spinal cord injury caused by oxygen deprivation or a
mechanical injury, and the infant is physically or mentally impaired. 99 If the commission determines that the injury falls within

the statute, it then awards compensation to the infant for his or
her economic losses, less any amount received from collateral

sources.?0 The commission's determination is conclusive and its
10 1
remedies are exclusive.

As a separate matter, the medical advisory board determines
whether the injury resulted from, or was aggravated by, the physician or the hospital.1° 2 The board has the authority to take
appropriate disciplinary action against the physician or the hospi03

tal.1

91Id. at 389.
92 VA. CODE .AN.
§ 38.2-5000 to 5021 (1988).
91 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.301-.316 (West 1988).
94 Supra note 92, at § 38.2-5004(A)(1); supra note 93, at § 766.305(l).
91Supra note 92, at § 38.2-5004(B); supra note 93, at § 766.308(1).
96Supra note 92, at § 38.2-5004(D); supra note 93, at § 766.308(1).
17Supra note 92, at § 38.2-5006; supra note 93, at § 766.307(1).
9' Supra note 92, at § 38.2-5008(A); supra note 93, at § 766.309(1)(a).
99 Supra note 92, at § 38.2-5008(A)(1); supra note 93, at § 766.309(I)(a)1.
100Supra note 92, at § 38.2-5009; supra note 93, at § 766.310(1).
101 Supra note 92, at §§ 38.2-5011, 38.2-5002(B); supra note 93, at §§ 766.311, 766.303.
'92 Supra note 92, at § 38.2-5004(B)-(C);
supra note 93, at § 766.305(4)-(5).
101Supra note 92, at §§ 38.2-5004(B), 38.2-5004(C); supra note 93, at § 766.305(4)-(5).
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. 303

The program is financed through a compensation fund. 1°4 Participating physicians and hospitals contribute an initial assessment
fee to join the program. 105 Insurance carriers contribute an annual
assessment in proportion to the premiums they write for all medical
activity. 16 Early indications are that the statute has been successful
10 7
in terms of increased access and reduced rates of insurance.
Traditionally, no-fault mechanisms have developed in areas
where tort systems have failed to adequately compensate injured
plaintiffs, and where the costs of the system became so burdensome
as to outweigh its benefits. In areas where no-fault approaches
have been applied, such as workers' compensation, automobile
insurance, and the Vaccine Act, costs have been reduced while the
speed and reliability of compensation has improved. Because the
problems facing the medical profession are substantially similar, a
no-fault methodology that is properly tailored to medical malpractice should vastly improve compensation and deterrence while reducing costs.
III.

PROPOSAL FOR A MALPRACTICE TRiBUNAL

In the long-term, a non-adversarial system, similar to a nofault approach, is the best alternative available to the existing tort
system for compensating victims of medical malpractice. Because
most cases of injury are truly accidental, involving neither malice
nor gross negligence on the part of a physician, the most just,
non-adversarial system would function most efficiently by using a
malpractice tribunal. The tribunal, which would include at least
one medical representative, one attorney, and one lay person,
would investigate complaints of medical malpractice. The tribunal
would then make a finding as to provider liability and determine
compensation for the victim. The decisions of such a tribunal
would be final. The tribunal would also have the power to recommend sanctions against a health care provider to appropriate
licensing and disciplinary agencies. The system would increase the
fairness and speed with which injuries are redressed and allegations

,04Supra note 92, at § 38.2-5015; supra note 93, at § 766.314(1).
101Supra note 92, at § 38.2-5019 (repealed 1989) (§ 38.2-5020 now provides for an
annual assessment); supra note 93, at § 766.314(4)(b)I.
106Supra note 92, at § 38.2-5020; supra note 93, at § 766.314(5)(c)I.
,o7Note, Innovative No-Fault Tort Reform for an Endangered Specialty, 74 VA. L.
Ray. 1487, 1499-1500 (1988).
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of malpractice are investigated, while minimizing transaction and
emotional costs.
This malpractice tribunal would be empowered to investigate
claims of medical malpractice by gathering evidence and by obtaining testimony from the parties, third persons, and experts. In
this respect, the role of the tribunal would be substantially similar
to that of the master under the Vaccine Act. 10 This type of
approach should substantially reduce the costs associated with the
current system, where costly legal and other professional talent is
directed toward persuading a jury as to whether someone's "fault"
"caused" a patient's injury.
This scheme, however, must limit the spectrum of events under
which a victim could be compensated in medical malpractice cases.
In its broadest application, a no-fault compensation system would
encompass all deteriorations in health that medical treatment fails
to cure or inhibit. 1' 9 Such a system would be enormously costly
and for that reason infeasible."10 By retaining the general relationship between deterrence and compensation while not requiring
costly case-by-case determinations of negligence, the tribunal offers
a "middle ground" between compensating all those who are medically injured and the current tort system of determining negligence
on a case-by-case basis.
Because the tribunal's objective is to replace the tort system in
medical malpractice cases, its authority should be limited to compensating claimants whose injuries actually stem from substandard
medical practice. For instance, persons whose injuries resulted from
a preexisting condition would not be compensated because they are
not compensated presently under typical tort principles.
Pursuant to the Vaccine Act, a Vaccine Injury Table"' was
compiled. When a condition listed in the table occurred, a rebuttable presumption arose that the injury was caused by the vacMUnder

the Vaccine Act, a master obtains evidence and conducts hearings in an

inquisitorial, non-adversary fashion. The sole issue that the master determines is whether

or not the injury was vaccine-related. If the claimant's injury is one of those listed and it
occurred within the applicable time frame, there is a rebuttable presumption that the injury
was caused by the vaccine. No showing of fault is necessary for compensation to be awarded.
See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 82, at 390.
- Moore & O'Connell, supra note 71, at 1269,
110See Tancredi, supra note 1, at 280; see also, O'Connell, supra note 21.
- 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-14 (West Supp. 1989). The Vaccine Injury Table lists the
various injuries, disabilities, illnesses, conditions, and death that can arise from the various
vaccines. It also lists the time period in which the first symptom or manifestation of injury
must occur in order for the injured party to be entitled to compensation under the program.
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cine." 2 Because there are myriad forms of medical malpractice and
because a finding of negligence is necessary, a much more general
table of injuries would have to be developed for medical malpractice cases. Such a table would define the scope of the tribunal's
jurisdiction and would yield useful statistical information that would
likely encourage avoidance of those outcomes. Deterrence against
future malpractice would, thereby, be engendered without the blunt
113
threat of expensive lawsuits that currently exists.
In 1980, the American Bar Association conducted a study of
such a scheme and outlined the Designated Compensable Event
System ("DCE"). 11 4 Lists of treatment-related injuries, which have
a strong presumption of occurring due to malpractice, would be
developed. The tribunal would refer to such lists in deciding whether
or not to compensate the victim. Such lists would improve the
predictability of outcomes by setting forth detailed outcomes that
would give rise to compensation. This predictability should also
reduce transaction costs because claims would be processed more
quickly than under the present tort system.
A DCE system is attractive because of its flexibility. Since it is
sometimes difficult to determine whether an outcome was triggered
by malpractice or was a natural result of injury, the tribunal can
go beyond the list, using it as a guideline to determine the amount
of the award. Additionally, if there is no listing of adverse outcomes for a particular event, for example, when a patient complains of various vague symptoms that a doctor misdiagnoses due
to the rarity of the patient's illness, the tribunal would have the
power to base the award on its collective experience. In cases
involving an event that is not listed as compensable, the victim
may be eligible for compensation if he or she proves fault to the
satisfaction of the tribunal.
,,2 Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 82, at 390.
,- If a higher percentage of malpractice victims come forward and receive appropriate
remedies under a no-fault plan than they do today, the information available to providers
of health care would likewise become more complete and accurate than it is currently. See
Tancredi, supra note 1, at 280-82,
,,, The Commission on Medical Professional Liability explored a number of innovative
alternatives, including a plan to compensate patients for all medically-caused injuries that
occur in a hospital, a workers' compensation type of mechanism providing scheduled benefits
to patients injured as the result of negligence, and two proposals that would define specifically the circumstances under which compensation would be paid. The Commission concluded that the most promising alternative was the DCE system, which would pre-define
compensable outcomes according to established criteria. AsmEucAN BAR AssOCIATiON DEsIGNATED COMPENSABLE EVENT SYsTEM: A FEAsmlrry STUDY (1979).
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Furthermore, such a DCE system would likely increase malpractice prevention while decreasing costs associated with defensive
medicine. The lists created under DCE would identify those outcomes that the medical community believes are preventable through
standard medical care. Doctors would then be able to concentrate
their efforts on eschewing those outcomes, instead of taking costly
precautions against all theoretically possible malpractice claims.
Once the tribunal investigates and determines whether there has
been an injury caused by substandard care, it has the power to
compensate victims for their losses. The funds for compensation
could come from a trust fund, much as it does under the Vaccine
Act. Financing could come from general tax revenues, an excise
tax on medical goods and services, an "insurance tax" on physicians, or some combination of the above. 5 Statistical information
arising from the tribunal's cases may be used to formulate a tax
rating system. For example, if the tribunal finds that a physician
has committed malpractice, the physician would be required to
contribute subsidies to the fund. Additionally, physicians who offer
treatment to high-risk patients might be required to make additional contributions.
Since the purpose of the tribunal system is to compensate
victims without having to expose them to a lottery system of either
a massive recovery or nothing at all, the tribunal might limit
compensation to actual economic losses. Such a limit would decrease the overall size of awards, but would increase the consistency
of awards for similar injuries. However, exceptions could be made
if associated pain and suffering were egregious, e.g., when nonwage earners are permanently injured due to malpractice and are
unable to perform many functions that they were able to do
previously. Because restitution of pure economic loss might not
adequately compensate victims in these exceptional cases, the tribunal could take pain and suffering into account in awarding
compensation.11 6 In most cases, however, compensation would be
limited to actual costs such as medical expenses, rehabilitation,
funeral expenses, lost earnings, and diminished capacity.
Under the tribunal system, intangible mental and emotional
items, including pain and suffering, would not be compensated.
-'

See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 82.
A non-wage earner would receive an extremely small award for serious injury when
compensation is based exclusively on economic loss. Hence, courts may be permitted, in
such situations, to allow recovery for pain and suffering. See Moore & O'Connell, supra
note 71, at 1282.
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Although, initially, such a limitation may sound unduly restrictive,
this method might result in appropriate compensation to a greater
number of deserving victims without a substantial increase in the
overall cost to society. Finally, punitive damages, meant to punish
the physician and to deter future wrongdoers, would be eliminated.
Such considerations would be left to the conscientious exercise of
sanctions that licensing boards can impose.
Due to the reduced expense and the higher probability of
compensation under the proposed system, more victims should be
willing to file claims. The proposed system could limit the number
of frivolous claims by excluding "small" claims that fall below a
specified amount (e.g., $5,000). In such cases, the loss might be
left where it fell since it is relatively inconsequential.
However, the inconsequentiality of the loss varies with the
assets and resources of the injured. Therefore, a preferred approach
might be to cast the threshold for bringing a claim in terms of a
percentage of the patient's total assets or resources. For example,
when a claim is asserted that would amount to less than a certain
percentage of total net worth or annual income, as verified by
documents such as federal tax returns, no payment would be
forthcoming. However, even in cases where a claim would be
disqualified on these quantitative grounds, the tribunal could refer
the incident to the licensing authority for discipline, if appropriate.
Thus, an injured patient with a claim too small to merit compensation still might have an incentive, of a psychological nature, to
report such an incident so that the offending physician might be
subjected to discipline.
The decisions of the tribunal should be final. Conversely, some
proponents of no-fault approaches have suggested a system where
a patient could bring a traditional tort suit if the victim disagreed
with the finding of the tribunal. However, such a system would
not rectify the deficiencies of the current system and would add to
overall costs because doctors would still perform excessive testing
on patients in fear of possible lawsuits and, also, would need some
type of insurance to cover these contingencies.
A compulsory tribunal system would alter the substantive rights
and duties among health care providers and patients and, therefore,
might be challenged as unconstitutional. A review of the relevant
issues, however, indicates that such concerns should not be material. For example, because the non-adversarial tribunal system will
only apply to adverse medical outcomes, the system may be challenged under the equal protection clause on the ground that it
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discriminates between persons injured in medical accidents and
those injured in other kinds of accidents. Under the equal protection clause, the Supreme Court has held that, unless the classification affects a suspect class such as race or national origin, only
a rational basis test will be used.17 Under the relaxed, minimum
rationality standard of review, the unequal treatment of classes of
injured parties is clearly justifiable, since rationality could be demonstrated empirically on the basis of the data used to compile
18
the lists of compensable events.
A stronger attack might be made under substantive due process.
The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution
prohibit the government from depriving any person of "life, liberty
or property without due process of law."' 1 9 A change from the
current tort system to the proposed tribunal system should survive
this due process attack because only a rational basis test is used
when no fundamental right is involved. Under such a test, laws
such as workers' compensation statutes have previously been upheld.1 20 The Supreme Court, in evaluating a New York workers'
compensation statute, found no violation when the state replaced
the tort system with the compulsory compensation scheme because
the statute merely set aside one body of rules to establish another,12 '
Accordingly, the Court would likely find the tribunal system constitutional because the non-adversarial system is a reasonable substitute for the current tort system. Thus, against both equal
protection and substantive due process challenges, the no-fault
tribunal system should pass constitutional muster.
The tribunal might also be in a position to objectively identify
those health providers who exercise substandard care. In part, this
might occur due to the relative convenience and reduced expense
of bringing claims. Thus, although providers of health care would
not be personally liable for damages under the proposed scheme,
the deterrence element could actually be greater than under the
existing system. Doctors identified as habitual substandard providers would be subject to peer review and discipline by hospital

i,

See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 245 (1941). See also AmPCwAN BAR

ASSOCIATION,

supra note 114, at 88.

"I Id. at 83.

U.S. CONST. art. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
,20
AMEmucAN BA ASSOCIATION, supra note 114, at 88.
2I New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
"9
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boards or licensing panels.122 In appropriate cases, the tribunal
itself could recommend discipline to the relevant bodies.
The information generated by the tribunal could be used to
make ratings of health care providers publicly available. This would
improve the public's overall knowledge of available medical care
and would allow the public to control the quality and cost of its
to engage in
health care. Providers would have a direct incentive
12
skilled and careful, but not defensive, medicine. 1
CONCLUSION

The advantages of a malpractice tribunal over the existing tort
system would be substantial. The malpractice tribunal would greatly
reduce the economic costs of bringing a claim for malpractice by
eliminating much of the adversarial character of the present system.
The non-adversarial system would reduce the burden on patients
and provide compensation more quickly.' 24
By removing medical malpractice from the realm of private
insurance and direct provider liability, much of the burden of
determining actual liability would be reduced. Without the fear of
personal financial impact, providers might be inclined to cooperate
with the tribunal in many cases. Also, diluting the fear of malpractice liability should result in improved doctor-patient trust.
Doctors might fully disclose medical risks without fear that such
information would be used against them in court. The patient
would also have more faith in the doctor's actions, knowing that
tests were not being performed solely as a hedge against possible
future lawsuits. 1 2
Provider cooperation would also reduce the overall transaction
costs of claims by speeding the process of determining liability.
Conversely, plaintiffs would not be encouraged to seek the "big
hit" of extravagant awards, since the awards could be more closely
tailored to actual injuries sustained. Thus, the difficulty of determining actual loss would be reduced. 126
The proposed non-adversarial malpractice tribunal would succeed in the two areas where tort has failed: fairly and consistently
'1 See generally Tancredi, supra note 1.
,23Tancredi, supra note 1, at 279-80.
,21See Schwartz & Mahshigian, supra note 82, at 389-90; see also Tancredi, supra note
1, at 279.
115See generally J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 22, at 30-43; see also Tancredi, supra note
1, at 279.
6 O'Connell, supra note 21, at 125-26.
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compensating persons injured through medical malpractice, and
deterring substandard medical practice through positive incentive.
The malpractice tribunal would cost less than medical malpractice
litigation today, would assist the medical profession by improving
available information and heightening awareness, and would discourage a litigation "lottery" while not inhibiting legitimate claims.
Like workers' compensation, no-fault auto insurance, and the Vaccine Act of 1986, the malpractice tribunal could be a viable solution
in another area where the costs of tort litigation have long outweighed the benefits.

